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CONFLICT OF LAWS

T

HE conflict of laws decisions in the Southwest during 1954

involved both jurisdictional and choice of law questions.
While the latter were more numerous, the former resulted in more
controversial holdings in the area of jurisdiction of courts over
foreign corporations.
I.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS

JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

Two cases raised the issue of whether a foreign corporation
which had some contact with the state of the forum, but was not
qualified to do regular business there, was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state. In Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting
Co.' the defendant, an Arkansas corporation, was engaged in the
creosoting business almost exclusively in Arkansas. However, at
times truckers were hired in Arkansas to go into Louisiana to
haul poles back to the Arkansas plant. While driving on such a
mission, plaintiff's decedent was killed in a highway accident.
Plaintiff sued in Louisiana for workmen's compensation, serving
the defendant through substituted process pursuant to a Louisiana
statute.! The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that there was no
jurisdiction over the defendant, pointing out that while the defendant had been engaged in several such tree cutting and hauling
activities at the time of the accident, all activities in Louisiana
had ceased by the time suit was instituted. However, the court
said that it was only necessary that defendant be doing business
in Louisiana at the time of the accident to sustain jurisdiction,
and that it was holding that defendant, by owning timber in the
state and having it removed to Arkansas, was not sufficiently doing
business at that time to make it amenable to process.
While the fact that El Dorado's operations in Louisiana were
in the course of its business and were somewhat regular over a
period of time might raise some doubts as to the court's holding,
1----------La. App - ..........71 So. 2d 613 (1954).
2L.S.A.-R.S. 13:3471 (5) (d) (1950).
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the question is further complicated by the contemporaneous decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in S. Howes Co. v. W. P.
Milling Co.' In that case the defendant, again a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in Oklahoma, had received an
order from an independent broker in Oklahoma for a machine
defendant manufactured which the plaintiff desired to buy. The
sale was consummated through the broker. The machine proved
faulty, and the plaintiff, an Oklahoma corporation, brought suit
in Oklahoma for breach of warranty. Again service was made on
the Secretary of State pursuant to an Oklahoma statute,4 and the
only question before the court on appeal was that of jurisdiction
over the defendant. The court, in a 5 to 4 decision, held that the
defendant was sufficiently doing business in Oklahoma to sustain
the court's jurisdiction. So far as it appears from the opinion,
the single transaction involved was the defendant's only business
activity in Oklahoma. Nevertheless the court, heavily relying on
the liberal trend it discerned in International Shoe Co. v. State
of Washington,6 emphasized that the test of doing business was
"qualitative" and not "purely mechanical or quantitative," i.e., the
essential nature of defendant's activity, as the majority saw it,
was that of "doing business" and therefore the court had jurisdiction regardless of the fact that this was defendant's only transaction in Oklahoma. The dissenting members of the court sharply
disagreed with the holding that such minimal activity amounted
to "doing business," and pointed out that, not only was there no
regular pattern of activity here, but also that in this transaction
defendant had not even had its own salesman in Oklahoma but had
concluded the sale by mail through an independent broker.
These two holdings are difficult to harmonize and serve chiefly
to point up the unsettled state of the law on the question of the
jurisdiction of the courts of a state over foreign corporations
which have not consented to such jurisdiction and are engaged in
a minimum of activities there.6 The idea expressed by Chief Jus3

.......... Okla ..............277 P. 2d 655 (1954).
18 0. S. sees. 1.17, 472 (1951).

5 362 U. S. 310, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
6 See 1 BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, sees. 89.1-89.3 (1935).
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tice Taney in his famous dictum' is necessarily a thing of the
past, but to what extent, under what circumstances and on what
theory does a state acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation? Where the corporation qualifies to carry on local business,
the state may require appointment of an agent for service' or provide that by qualifying for business the corporation consents to
service of the type in the above cases.9 This is based on the doctrine of the consent of the corporation. But where the corporation
has not entered the state to the extent of qualifying to carry on
local business, the problem becomes more difficult. The question
seemingly turns on the facts of the particular case as to whether
the corporation's activities are such that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state as to causes of action arising from such activity
will not violate due process or unduly burden interstate commerce. 0 The leading recent decision by the United States Supreme Court on this was given in InternationalShoe Co. v. State
of Washington. In that case the court described the test of doing
business as "qualitative" and not "mechanical or quantitative," as
referred to by the Oklahoma court above, and seemed to synthesize the idea of doing business with the doing of an act. But the
court also emphasized the systematic and continuous character of
the corporation's activities - an element which was noticeably
absent in the Oklahoma case. A comparison of the facts of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington with those of S. Howes
Co. v. W. P. Milling Co. would indicate that the Oklahoma court
went to the extreme in sustaining jurisdiction in the latter case.
Conversely, it would seem that in the light of the Supreme Court's
holding, the Louisiana court was rather conservative in holding
that it had no jurisdiction over the defendant in Johnson v. El
7
. a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created ...It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty." Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U. S.
1839).
8 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855) ; S. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S.
350 (1882).
9 See Davis v. Farmer's Cooperative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923), where constitutional limitations on this doctrine are discussed. Cf. International Harvester Co.
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
10 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907) ; Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115 (1915). But see Missouri, K. & T. R. v. Reynolds, 255 U. S.
565 (1921) ; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
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Dorado Creosoting Co., although this case can be distinguished by
the fact that the corporation's activities were not in the nature of
commercial transactions.
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION -

FORUM NON- CONVENIENS

A related but essentially different question was brought before
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.
v. Superior Court," when it was asked to declare whether or not
the Oklahoma law of conflict of laws included the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. This doctrine, that where neither the plaintiff, the defendant nor the cause of action is related to the forum,
the case will not be heard there, has been adhered to by only a few
courts1" and expressly rejected by some others. 3 However, in recent cases the United States Supreme Court has approved the exercise of the doctrine by federal courts.' 4
In the case before the Oklahoma court three suits had been
filed in the Superior Court by employees of defendant who were
residents of Kansas and Missouri for damages resulting from
injuries sustained in Missouri. The defendant was a Missouri corporation. The claims and jurisdiction were based on the Federal
Employer's Liability Act.'" The defendant maintained that because of the severe inconvenience to it in trying the case in Oklahoma, the court should in its discretion dismiss the suit on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Superior Court believed
it had no such discretion and refused to dismiss. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma sustained the corporation, and thereby established that Oklahoma adheres to the doctrine. The court's description of the doctrine as being discretionary and depending on the
276 P. 2d
Okla .............
11-...........

773 (1954).
Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. 2d 426 (D. Ore. 1930), affirmed in 50
F. 2d 382 (9th Cir. 1931); Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y.S. 619 (1st
Dep't. 1903).
189H. Rouw Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 154 S.W. 2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error ref., noted in 20 TEXAS L. REv. 609 (1942). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
sees. 192-202 (1934).
14 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947) ; Koster v. Lumberman's Mut.
Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947) ; Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U. S.
549 (1946). The doctrine has been codified for federal courts in 28 U. S. C. §§ 14041406 (1952).
15 35 STAT. 65, 66, as amended, 45 U. S. C. sees. 51-60 (1952).
12
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particular circumstances of the case, as well as its application
of the doctrine in this case, was in accord with the basic principles
of forum non conveniens."6
II.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Where a person is employed in one state but is injured in
another, does he have a valid workmen's compensation claim in
the state of the injury or the state of hiring or both? All three
aspects of this problem were presented to the courts in the Southwest in the past year. The source of many recent decisions over
the nation, this question has usually been answered in the affirmative as to all three possibilities. It has been held that the claim
can be made in the state of hiring on the theory that the parties
tacitly include in the employment contract the terms of the local
act unless they express a contrary intention. 7 Also it has been
held that the state where the injury occurs has sufficient interest
to justify its exercise of police powers through its compensation
act. 8 And it has been held that the claimant who has recovered
in the state of the injury may also recover in the state of hiring,
provided that the amount first recovered should be credited to
the second recovery."
The second question decided by the court in Johnson v. El
Dorado Creosoting Co. was whether or not claim could be maintained under the Louisiana Act. Plaintiff's decedent, a resident
16 See Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P. 2d 457 (1954) ; Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950); Chambers v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907) ; Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377
(1928) ; on which the court relied in holding that the fact that the claim and the jurisdiction were based on a Federal statute did not prevent the state court from exercising
its discretion by dismissing on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
17 Matter of Post v. Burger, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N.W. 351 (1916) ; 2 BEALE, Op. Cit.
supra note 6, sec. 398.2. C!. Alaska Packer's Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n. of Cal.,
294 U. S. 532 (1935). As to extra hazardous occupations see Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622 (1930) ; 16 VA. L. REv. 701 (1930).
18 State ex rel. Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Comm'n., 339 Mo.
150, 95 S.W. 2d 641 (1936) ; Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 54 P. 2d 371 (1936) ; McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 212 Wis. 507, 250 N.W. 396 (1933).
But cf. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS sees. 339, 400 (1948 Supp.).
19 McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N.E. 338 (1931) ; Hughey v. Ware, 34
N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27 (1929) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 203 Wis. 466,
234 N.W. 889 (1931). Cl. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943), as
to awards which are regarded as conclusive. See STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS 217-222 (2d ed. 1951).
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of Arkansas, had been hired in Arkansas by defendant, an Arkansas corporation, but was killed in a highway accident while
hauling poles in Louisiana. The Louisiana court said that al.
though its decision on the first question made it unnecessary, it
would go on to hold that the fact that the accident occurred in
Louisiana alone was sufficient to bring the compensation claim
under the Louisiana Act. In this the court was in line with the
decisions above.20
The converse aspect of the question was presented to the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Franklin v. Geo. P. Livermore, Inc.21
Plaintiff, a resident of Hobbs, New Mexico, was hired there by a
representative of the defendant to work on oil drilling rigs 15
miles away in Texas. While doing this work, plaintiff continued
to live in Hobbs. In the course of his employment plaintiff was
injured, for which defendant's insurance carrier voluntarily made
payments pursuant to the provisions of the Texas Act for 15
weeks. Here plaintiff brought suit for compensation under the
New Mexico Act. The issue of crediting defendant with the
amount voluntarily paid under the Texas Act was disposed of by
an agreement between the parties, and the only question before
the court was whether plaintff could maintain his claim in New
Mexico. The court construed the employment as temporary, since
it had not lasted more than six months, and held that therefore
plaintiff was covered by the extraterritorial provision of the New
Mexico Act.22 The court also held that in order to maintain the
claim, it was not necessary that plaintiff had ever worked for de.
fendant in New Mexico, but that it was sufficient that the contract
of employment had been made there. It would seem that the
court was quite correct in so holding, since the basis of sustaining the claim under the Act of the state of hiring is that the parties
included the Act in their contract. Thus it is the making of the
employment contract rather than entering into its performance
that supports the claim. 2
20 See note 18 supra. However some courts have been restrictive on this view;
Finkley v. Eugene Saenger Tailoring Shop, 100 Ind. App. 549, 196 N.E. 536 (1935);
Freeman v. Higgins, 123 Neb. 73, 242 N.W. 271 (1932).
21 -----------N. M .
270 P. 2d 983 (1954).
22 N. M. S. COMP. sec. 57-933 (1941).
23 See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 100 (3rd ed. 1949) for a discussion of this
theory.
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III. CONTRACTS
INTERPRETATION

The third and last question decided by the Louisiana court in
Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co. dealt with the interpretation of the contract between El Dorado and its compensation insurance carrier. This policy had been written and issued in Arkansas
and was to cover injuries to all of El Dorado's employees as re.
quired by Arkansas statute.2 ' Under the Arkansas Act plaintiff's
decedent would be classified as an independent contractor rather
than an employee and thus unable to recover, but under the Act
of Louisiana, where the claim was made, plaintiff's decedent
would be covered. The court held that the insurance contract
should be interpreted by the Arkansas statute and thus would not
cover the present claim which would not be valid by that Act. The
court said that it would not be justified in construing the contract to
cover any claim that might be made against El Dorado, where such
claims would be invalid in Arkansas.
Since the problem of which law should govern the interpretation of a contract is basically one of determining expressed intention rather than one of validity, 5 it would seem that the court
was justified in reaching the result it did. El Dorado operated
almost exclusively in Arkansas, and its employees, including plaintiff's decedent, were residents of Arkansas. The Arkansas Act was
the only one mentioned in the contract. Thus it would seem that
the parties probably intended their language to have the legal
effect it would have under the Arkansas law.26 However, this would
have produced a curious result had the court held that it had jurisdiction over El Dorado. In that event plaintiff's claim would have
succeeded as to El Dorado, but the insurance carrier would not
be liable on its contract, and it would seem that the primary intent
of the parties in making the contract was that El Dorado should
be insured against all compensation claims arising in the course
of its business.
24

ARK. STATS. see 81-1338 (1947).
25 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 23, sec. 112.

26 Cf. Hurt v. Pennsylvania Threshermen's & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 175
Md. 403, 2 A. 2d 402 (1938) ; Salkind v. Pennsylvania Threshermen's & Farmers' Mut.
Casualty Ins. Co., 335 Pa. 326, 6 A. 2d 301 (1939).
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ESSENTIAL VALIDITY

The question of which law should govern the essential validity
of a contract is one of the most confused and unsettled in the
field of conflict of laws. The courts have varied between applying
the law of the place of contracting, the law of the place of performance, and the law intended by the parties to govern, and
shortcomings have been found in each approach.2 7
Twice in the past year the question of the validity of a contract
was presented to federal courts sitting in the Southwest. In both
cases federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship,
and the court in each instance properly applied the law of conflict
of laws of the state where it was sitting under the rule of Erie
R. R. Co. v. Tompkins."8
In General Beverages Inc. v. Rogers29 plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation, sued on a note executed and payable in Alabama. The
note was void under Alabama law because of an illegal consideration, but apparently plaintiff was hoping that the federal court
sitting in Oklahoma would hold it valid under Oklahoma law. The
Court of Appeals, in applying the Alabama law, was unquestionably correct, since the place of performance and the place of contracting were the same in this case. Although it was not necessary
for decision in this case, the court said that apparently the prevailing rule in Okahoma is that the law of the place of performance
always governs the validity of a contract. After considerable
uncertainty in the earlier Oklahoma cases which indicated that
the lex loci contractu might govern, ° it seems to be well established now that Oklahoma adheres to the rule that the law of the
place of performance should govern."1 Clearly the law of the
2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 6, secs. 332.1-332.5.
28 304 U. S. 64 (1938). Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U. S.
27

487 (1941).
29 216 F. 2d 413 (10th Cir. 1954).
30 Steward v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 290 Okla. 754, 119 Pac. 216 (1911) ; Klien
v. Keller, 42 Okla. 592, 141 Pac. 1117 (1914) ; Fist v. La Batte, 69 Okla. 224, 171 Pac.
1120 (1918) ; Missouri F. & C. Co. v. Scott, 72 Okla. 59, 178 Pac. 122 (1918). Cf. Western U. T. Co. v. Pratt, 18 Okla. 274, 89 Pac. 237 (1907) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v.
Smith, 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494 (1913).
81 Security Trust Co. v. Gleichman, 50 Okla. 441, 150 Pac. 908 (1915) ; Denison v.
Phipps, 87 Okla. 299, 211 Pac. 83 (1922) ; Sheehan Pipe Line Co. v. State Industrial
Comm'n., 151 Okla. 272, 3 P. 2d 199 (1931) ; Collins v. Holland, 169 Okla. 10, 34 P.
2d 587 (1934).
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forum would never govern, and it is surprising that this contention
was seriously presented to the Court of Appeals.
A similar contention, equally surprising, was made in Miller v.
American Ins. Co.32 Suit was instituted in the federal court in
Arkansas on a fire insurance policy written and issued in Texas
to plaintiff, a Texas citizen. The policy contained a provision for
aribtration before suit which was valid under Texas law but void
under an Arkansas statute. Plaintiff had not complied with this
provision, but had brought suit immediately upon loss. The court
dismissed the suit as premature because of this non-compliance
and said that Arkansas conflict of laws rules rather than the Arkansas statute applied, and by these rules validity of the provision
was governed by Texas law. The court pointed out that a party
cannot escape such a provision, which is valid by the laws where
it was made and to be performed, merely by bringing suit in a
forum where such a clause would not be valid had it been made
there.
The court went on to say that the fact of the Arkansas statute
did not manifest a sufficiently strong public policy in Arkansas
against arbitration clauses to prevent the application of the Texas
law. It is clear that a strong policy of the forum can prevent
application of foreign law, but that this must be more than simply
policy of the internal law of a state as evidenced by a statute is
also fairly certain. 3 It has even been urged that the rule of public
policy should seldom if ever be applied among sister states in the
United States.34 This is more readily seen once it is understood
that the court, in looking to foreign law, is not giving that law
any extraterritorial effect, but rather is applying the law of conflict of laws of the forum itself.35
IV.

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS OF LAND

A special aspect of the problem of which law should govern
the disposition by will of an interest in land where the domicile
32

124 F. Supp. 160 (W. D. Ark. 1954).

33 Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413 (1883). Cf. Sulli-

van v. German Nat. Bank, 18 Colo. App. 99, 79 Pac. 162 (1902). See Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
34 BEACH, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L. J. 656,
662 (1928).
35 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 23, sec. 8.
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of the testator is in one state and the situs of the land in another
was presented to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Houston v.
Colonial Trust Co. 8 Testator, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, left
his entire estate, including some oil interests in Texas land, in
trust, half the income being payable to his wife for life or until
her remarriage. In the Pennsylvania probate proceedings the wife
elected to renounce the will and claim her dower rights. In the
present suit the wife claims a vested interest in the Texas property because it was purchased during coverture with the husband's
earnings which would have been community property had they
lived in Texas. The court rejected this contention and pointed
out that the status of the earnings was governed by Pennsylvania
law by which they are exclusively the property of the husband.
Then the court said that bringing the husband's property across
state lines and changing its form does not change the character of
its ownership. Although marital rights in land are generally determined by the law of the situs of the land, the particular instance
where earnings of the husband in a common law state are used
to purchase land in a community property state appears to be a
well settled exception. 7
In beginning the present suit the wife had expressed her desire
to elect to take under the will as to the Texas property in the event
that her first claim should be denied. Due to its first holding the
court was then presented with the question of whether the wife's
renunciation of the will in Pennsylvania was binding on her in
Texas as to interests in Texas land. The court said that this appeared to be a question of first impression in Texas, 8 but that the
majority of holdings in other jurisdictions was to the effect that
the first election was binding. Although indicating that it would
follow the majority, the court avoided actually deciding the point
by holding that since the wife's attempted election in Texas had
been expressly conditioned on the outcome of her first contention,
it was not sufficiently unequivocal to amount to a valid election.
36 266 S.W. 2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref, n.r.e., noted in 33 TEX. L. REV.
120 (1954).
37 Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907) ; in re Burrow's Estate,
136 Cal. 113, 68 Pac. 488 (1902) ; Ellington v. Harris, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S.E. 134 (1906) ;
Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W. 290 (1902) ; Clark v. Thayer, 98
Tex. 142, 81 S.W. 1274 (1904).
's No Texas decisions on this point have been found.
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The rule in the majority of states is that an election made in
one place is binding elsewhere, whether it is an election to renounce or to take under a will,8 9 provided that the formal requisites of both places are complied with." Once the election is found
to be binding, the rights thus acquired as to land are determined
by the law of the situs4 1 These rules are based generally on estoppel by election, and it would seem that the indication of the court
in the present case is entirely harmonious with them.
Hal Bateman.

39 Colvin v. Hutchison, 338 Mo. 576, 92 S.W. 2d 667 (1936) ; Mettler v. Warner, 98
Neb. 111, 152 N.W. 327 (1915) ; Martin v. Battey, 87 Kan. 582, 125 Pac. 88 (1912) ;
Mechling v. McAllister, 135 Minn. 358, 160 N.W. 1016 (1917). Contra, Brinkerhoff v.
Huntley, 223 Il. App. 591 (1921).
40 Apperson v. Bloton, 29 Ark. 418 (1874) ; Bish v. Bish, 181 Md. 621, 31 A. 2d 348
(1943) ; McGinnis v. Chambers, 156 Tenn. 404, 1 S.W. 2d 1015 (1928) ; In re Owsley's
Estate, 122 Minn. 190, 142 N.W. 129 (1913) ; Bolton v. Barnett, 131 Miss. 802, 95 So.
72 (1923).
41 Colvin v. Hutchison, 338 Mo. 576, 92 S.W. 2d 667 (1936) ; Singleton v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 191 S.W. 2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error rel., n.r.e.

